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1371 
Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing 
School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the Search for 
Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake 
Environment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Adam Porter’s little brother wanted to draw a llama.1 He found a 
discarded drawing pad in the closet, drew the llama, and took it to school 
the next day to show his middle-school teacher.2 An otherwise 
uneventful day at school transformed abruptly when another student 
flipped through the pad during the bus ride home and discovered a more 
provocative sketch drawn by Adam two years before: a crude rendition 
of the high school under siege by tanker truck, missile launcher, 
helicopter, and gunmen.3 The student immediately alerted the bus driver, 
and the school suspended Adam’s brother from school the next morning 
for possession of the picture.4 Adam, however, suffered the most severe 
consequences.5 Officials at East Ascension High School searched Adam, 
a junior, and recommended he be expelled.6 He was also locked in jail 
four nights for “terrorizing the school.”7 More than three years later, in 
December 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared Adam’s 
sketch fully protected under the First Amendment.8 In the time between 
 
 1. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 2530 (2005). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 611–12. 
 5. Id. at 612. 
 6. Id. The school officials’ decision was supported, at least partially, by the discovery of a 
box cutter; a notebook with references to death, drugs, sex, and gangs; and a fake ID in Adam’s 
backpack. Id. It is important to recognize, however, that the box cutter was for his after-school job, 
and that this event transpired before terrorists used box cutters in the September 11th hijackings—an 
event that heightened concern regarding the otherwise innocuous and mundane tool. Furthermore, 
the other items of concern in Adam’s backpack were common to many teenagers. If every high 
school student possessing a fake I.D. was expelled, school overcrowding would be solved overnight. 
Nevertheless, school administrators clung to these otherwise insignificant discoveries in the attempt 
to justify their decision. Id. 
 7. Id. at 612. 
 8. Id. at 620. 
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the initial events and the Fifth Circuit’s decision, school administrators 
forced Adam, under threat of expulsion, to enroll in a school for troubled 
students; he subsequently dropped out.9 By the time the constitutional 
dust settled, it was too late for Adam Porter. The courts may have finally 
vindicated him, but his high school experience was by then just a 
memory. 
School violence across the nation has created an atmosphere of fear, 
leaving administrators desperately searching for warning signs similar to 
those exhibited by past school shooters.10 Caution is warranted,11 and 
administrators must be empowered to act when they perceive that a 
danger exists,12 for history shows that unaddressed or unrecognized 
warning signs can transform into tragedy.13 But it is also important that 
 
 9. Id. at 612. Had Adam Porter originally drawn the sketch on school premises or instructed 
his brother to take it on campus, the outcome of the First Amendment analysis likely would have 
been very different. See id. at 617–20. Since the sketch was drawn off campus and never 
intentionally communicated, however, the court found that it was “outside the school” expression, 
was not a true threat, and consequently warranted First Amendment protection. Id. at 620. 
Unfortunately, that finding came several years after the events transpired and was largely a 
meaningless victory: Adam Porter’s high school career had long since ended, and the principal who 
initiated the actions against him was shielded by qualified immunity. See id. at 611–12. 
 10. According to the Center for Disease Control, it is crucial that schools improve safety by 
“watching for signals that precede violent outbursts, paying close attention to threats, and learning to 
recognize and respond to bullying behavior.” Press Release, United States Department of Education, 
Violent Deaths In or Near Schools Are Rare (Dec. 4, 2001), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2001/12/12042001.html. Over fifty percent of the incidents of 
school violence the CDC studied were preceded by signals such as “a note, threat, journal entry, or 
other action.” Mark Anderson et al., School-Associated Violent Deaths in the United States, 1994–
1999, 2001 JAMA 2695, 2701; see also Tyson Lewis, The Surveillance Economy of Post-Columbine 
Schools, 25 REV. EDUC. PEDAGOGY & CULT. STUD. 335 (2003) (discussing the various security 
changes implemented in schools in response to Columbine). As an example of signs exhibited before 
the Red Lake shootings, shooter Jeffrey Weise made numerous postings to neo-Nazi websites and 
expressed an obsession with school shootings. Heron Marquez Estrada et al., An Internet Trail of a 
Boy’s Death Wish, MINN. STAR TRIB., Mar. 24, 2005, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/5310301.html. 
 11. See generally Joseph Lintott, Note, Teaching and Learning in the Face of School 
Violence, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 553 (2004). 
 12. Preventing school violence is undoubtedly a compelling interest. Preventing 
administrators from responding to threats to safety in the interest of students’ First Amendment 
rights, which would essentially put unnecessary obstacles in administrators’ paths, would be both 
counterproductive (school violence is at least as damaging to student freedom as administrator 
action) and irresponsible. This Comment endeavors to reach a solution that permits educators to 
insulate their schools against violence without further eroding speech rights. 
 13. Most recently, on March 21, 2005, sixteen-year-old Jeffrey Weise murdered his 
grandfather and another adult and then opened fire on his classmates at Red Lake High School in 
Minnesota, killing five students, a teacher, and a security guard and injuring several others. School 
Gunman Stole Police Pistol, Vest, CNN, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 
US/03/22/school.shooting/index.html. Before the shooting rampage at Red Lake High School, 
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in the rush to prevent future violence administrators do not unnecessarily 
trample upon students’ First Amendment speech rights.14 
Since Columbine15 and the school shootings that preceded and 
followed it,16 courts addressing First Amendment protection on the 
 
Jeffrey Weise posted online a disturbing violent flash animation depicting a shooting. See School 
Killer’s Animated Terror, THE SMOKING GUN, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/ 
archive/0323051weise1.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). Further, his personal website included video 
captures from “Elephant,” a film about a school shooting. Id. 
 14. See David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts’ Inconsistent Treatment of 
Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 181 (2002) 
(The “movement toward increasing censorship by school officials has only escalated after a series of 
school shootings, culminating in the tragedy at Columbine High School.”); Robert D. Richards & 
Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in Public 
Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2003) (“[T]he events at Columbine gave high school 
administrators all the reasons—legitimate or illegitimate—they needed to trounce the First 
Amendment rights of public school students in the name of preventing violence.”). 
 15. Eric Harris, eighteen, and Dylan Klebold, seventeen, stormed their high school, 
murdering a dozen classmates and a teacher and injuring twenty-three others. Students Triumphant 
in Taking Back Columbine High, CNN, Aug. 16, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ 
US/9908/16/columbine.shooting.06/index.html; see also Tom Kentworthy, Up to 25 Die in 
Colorado School Shooting, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1 (describing “a shooting rampage on a 
scale unprecedented in an American school”); Dave Cullen, Inside the Columbine High 
Investigation, SALON, Sept. 23, 1999, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/09/23/ 
columbine/index.html. 
 16. Between 1996 and 2003, school shootings occurred in (chronologically listed and not 
comprehensive): Moses Lake, Washington (A fourteen-year-old shot a teacher and two students with 
a rifle.); Bethel, Alaska (A sixteen-year-old shot and killed his principal and a student, and two other 
students were injured.); Pearl, Mississippi (A sixteen-year-old killed his mother, then went to school 
and shot nine others; two died.); West Paducah, Kentucky (A fourteen-year-old shot eight students 
as they prayed in school; three died and one student was left paralyzed.); Stamps, Arkansas (An 
eighth-grader was arrested and charged as an adult after he confessed to shooting and wounding two 
of his fellow students as he hid in the woods outside of a high school.); Jonesboro, Arkansas (Two 
boys, ages eleven and thirteen, shot fourteen students and one teacher; the teacher and four of the 
students died.); Edinboro, Pennsylvania (A fourteen-year-old student shot a teacher to death at a 
graduation dance.); Pomona, California (A fourteen-year-old shot three boys; two died.); 
Fayettesville, Tennessee (An eighteen-year-old shot and killed a classmate just three days before 
graduation.); Springfield, Oregon (A fifteen-year-old shot and killed both parents before he went to 
school and opened fire in the cafeteria; two students were killed.); Columbia, South Carolina (A 
fourteen-year-old student was arrested after a school shooting that wounded a teacher and an elderly 
volunteer aid.); Richmond, Virginia (A fourteen-year-old student was charged as an adult for 
opening fire in a crowded high school hallway, wounding a teacher and a volunteer.); Conyers, 
Georgia (A fifteen-year-old wounded six classmates.); Fort Gibson, Oklahoma (A seventh-grader 
brought a handgun to school and opened fire; four students were wounded.); Lake Worth, Florida (A 
thirteen-year-old sent home from school returned with a handgun and killed a teacher.); Glendale, 
Arizona (A teenager held a teacher and thirty-two students hostage for an hour before surrendering.); 
Oxnard, California (A seventeen-year-old entered a school and took a girl hostage in an attempt to 
persuade police to shoot him; after the SWAT team arrived, he was shot dead.); Santee, California 
(A fifteen-year-old opened fire from inside a school bathroom, shooting fifteen and killing two.); El 
Cajon, California (Gunman injured three teens and two teachers at Granite Hills High School.); New 
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campuses of public schools17 have repeatedly held that “[a] school need 
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational 
mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech 
outside the school.”18 A student’s freedom of speech “in” school is less 
than his freedom of speech at home, work, a shopping mall, a movie 
theater, or virtually anywhere else “out” of school.19 However, the line 
designating what constitutes out-of-school speech is jagged with 
exceptions and caveats.20 In the absence of clear bright-line rules to 
 
York, New York (A teenager wounded two students at Martin Luther King Jr. High School.); Dallas, 
Texas (A fifteen-year-old male high school student was shot as he and fellow students tried to 
wrestle a gun away from another fourteen-year-old student.); Seattle, Washington (A thirteen-year-
old male fired a rifle in a middle school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the 
gun to kill himself.); Westminster, Colorado (A fourteen-year-old male freshman was taken into 
custody after several shots were fired in a high school courtyard.); Red Lion, Pennsylvania (A 
fourteen-year-old male junior high school student shot and killed his principal inside a crowded 
cafeteria and then killed himself with a second gun according to police.); Cold Spring, Minnesota 
(One student died and another was hospitalized after a shooting in a Minnesota high school; a 
teacher talked the student into surrendering.). Sch. Violence Res. Ctr., Nat’l Ctr. for Rural Law 
Enforcement, School Shootings Map and Descriptions from 1996–2003, 
http://www.svrc.net/ShootingsMap.htm#Fort%20Gibson (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 17. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding regulation of 
student speech that is related to school-sponsored activities); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986) (upholding regulation of student speech that is lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly 
offensive); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibiting 
viewpoint-specific regulations unless the regulated speech substantially interferes with the work of 
the school); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding school 
regulations that further substantial government interests unrelated to the suppression of student 
expression). 
 18. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted).  
 19. The Supreme Court has not specified how much authority a public school can assert over 
off-campus student expression, but it is a logical inference that when students are not in school, they 
are not students but, rather, general citizens. Consequently, they are governed by general principles 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, which does not distinguish between adults and minors. See Clay 
Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet 
Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 271 (2001). 
 20. Specifically, questions loom regarding how to classify speech made or composed off 
campus and subsequently brought to campus by a third party. Many courts have ruled that 
expressions created off campus, and then intentionally brought on campus, or even intentionally 
communicated and subsequently brought on campus, are treated as in-school expression. See Doe v. 
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619–20, 627 (8th Cir. 2002) (upholding 
punishment of student for writing threatening letters later brought on campus by a friend without 
authorization from the student); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(allowing expulsion of student on emergency basis for bringing on campus a violent poem that he 
had written off campus); Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 822–23, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(disciplining student for an article printed in an underground newspaper that was distributed on 
campus); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1072, 1075–77 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(upholding punishment of student for authoring article printed in underground newspaper distributed 
off campus but near school grounds). However, other courts have held that off-campus speech is 
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follow, teachers and administrators sometimes react out of fear and 
suppress speech that, in retrospect, should be protected. Additionally, the 
traditional legal framework for assessing threats is overinclusive21 when 
dealing with student speech, overreacting to harmless speech and thus 
being spread so thin as to be unable to respond to legitimate dangers. 
Further, fearing punishment, many students choose to suppress their 
speech, thus concealing potential warning signs. As Columbine, Red 
Lake, and other tragedies have demonstrated, and as future tragedies may 
demonstrate, speech can be infringed, but violence is likely to continue. 
With greater student speech, a student contemplating violence will be 
more likely to express his feelings. Warning signs will surface and, with 
the appropriate guidelines in place, these signs can be dealt with. A 
danger known is much safer than a danger that goes unspoken until it is 
too late. In this regard, encouraging the open exchange of student speech 
is as vital to school safety as it is to First Amendment rights. 
This Comment proposes two needed clarifications to balance 
educators’ rights to maintain a secure environment and students’ rights to 
express themselves by viewing school administrators’ evaluations of 
student threats and warning signs as a two-step process: (1) use of a clear 
standard to determine whether student speech is within their jurisdiction 
(the on-campus/off-campus question),22 and if so, (2) determination if 
student speech actually threatens school safety through application of 
specific guidelines modeled after those proposed by the United States 
 
entitled to full First Amendment protection even when it makes its way onto school grounds without 
the assistance of the speaker. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 
2004) (noting that some courts “have found that off-campus speech is entitled to full First 
Amendment protection even when it makes its way onto school grounds”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 
2530 (2005); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the limited 
abrogation of First Amendment rights is out of place with regard to off-campus speech); see also 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that a student punished for lewd 
comments made during a school-sponsored debate could not be punished had he “given the same 
speech outside of the school environment . . . simply because government officials considered his 
language to be inappropriate.”); Richards & Calvert, supra note 14, at 1116–20 (challenging the 
jurisdiction of administrators over student speech occurring off campus and subsequently brought on 
campus by a third party without the communicator’s permission). 
 21. It is overinclusive in the sense that it produces false warning signs for student speech, 
which though unsavory or even violent, ultimately poses little or no real danger to school safety.  
 22. Of course, not all off-campus, out-of-school speech—such as threats—is fully protected. 
However, the presumption in dealing with out-of-school speech, generally, is that it is fully protected 
and the burden, then, is to show that the speech in question represents an exception—such as threats 
or obscenity.  
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Secret Service.23 Contrary to what many assume, greater speech rights 
for students and safer schools are complementary objectives, rather than 
mutually exclusive goals. By delineating clear boundaries for school 
authorities regarding permissible and restricted speech, thereby affording 
greater freedom to student speech, schools will attain a greater degree of 
security than is otherwise possible since the free flow of student speech 
will likely include warning signs that would otherwise go unspoken or 
remain underground for fear of punishment. 
Part II.A of this Comment discusses the foundational case law 
established by the Supreme Court and circuit courts with regard to 
limited speech rights in public schools. Part II.B explores selected circuit 
and district court decisions addressing the on-campus/off-campus, in-
school/out-of-school distinction—an important threshold distinction in 
determining if a school has jurisdiction. Part III analyzes (a) the failure 
of the traditional threat analysis in the student context, (b) the troubling 
changes that public schools have undertaken in response to school 
violence and the significance of warning signs, as attested to by past 
shootings, and (c) guidelines that have been proposed to determine when 
a danger truly exists. Part IV proposes two modifications to the current 
law and procedure regarding student speech that will serve to heighten 
school safety while protecting student speech rights: (a) bright line rules 
to distinguish on- and off-campus speech, and (b) effective guidelines to 
evaluate when a threat exists. This proposed balance includes 
acknowledging the difference between a threat—as defined purely in 
terms of speech—and a warning sign, and responding appropriately. Part 
IV.C briefly sets forth the safety benefits of these proposals, and Part V 
offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE EVOLUTION AND CONFUSION OF 
ON-CAMPUS, IN-SCHOOL SPEECH 
A. Foundational Cases: Diminished Protection on Campus 
The freedom of speech afforded to students on campus (or when 
attending a school-sponsored activity away from campus) is perhaps best 
described as an abbreviated version of the freedom of speech society 
 
 23. See, e.g., ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THREAT 
ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING 
SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES (2002), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ 
ntac/ssi_guide.pdf. 
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typically enjoys.24 This Section discusses the cases that have shaped the 
jurisprudence regarding student speech. While courts vary in referring to 
“on-campus” speech and “in-school” speech, the two are virtually 
synonymous for the purposes of this Comment: essentially, the school 
campus expands for free-speech purposes to include any school-
sponsored activities, such as athletic events, even where the physical 
location would otherwise be deemed “off-campus.” 
Initially, courts recognized broad speech rights for students when off 
the school campus. Subsequent decisions, however, expanded the 
definition of “on-campus” and considerably eroded speech rights 
whenever the speech is construed as potentially causing a substantial 
disruption on campus—an elastic concept than can be stretched to 
include virtually any unpopular speech. Without a clear, firm test for 
what can potentially cause “substantial disruption,” virtually any off-
campus expression may be characterized and legally defined as on-
campus expression. 
The landmark case establishing the concept of on-campus speech25 
as a reduced form of traditional speech is Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.26 Three students planned to 
protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school, 
prompting administrators to adopt a policy forbidding the armbands with 
the threat of suspension.27 While overturning the school’s policy, the 
Supreme Court famously declared that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”28 Despite that emphatic statement, the Court did 
indeed limit students’ rights by holding that First Amendment protection 
does not extend to speech that materially disrupts class work or involves 
 
 24. “We have . . . recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public 
schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings’ . . . .” 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). For a discussion of the abbreviated First Amendment rights of students, 
see generally Leonard M. Niehoff, The Student’s Right to Freedom of Speech: How Much is Left at 
the Schoolhouse Gate?, 75 MICH. B.J. 1150 (1996). 
 25. On-campus speech, for purposes of this Comment, encompasses school sponsored field 
trips, transportation, athletic events, and performances, in which the school’s campus virtually 
travels with the student under the auspices of school sponsorship. The question this Comment 
grapples with is, instead, the rarer cases where the speech itself may drift into the school’s domain 
without the knowledge or desire of the student speaker. 
 26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 27. Id. at 504. 
 28. Id. at 506. 
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substantial disorder.29 In short, students do not shed their constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse gate, with an added and very large caveat: 
“unless their speech causes disruption.” 
Alone, Tinker seems to hold that students’ rights are fully protected 
unless school authorities reasonably believe that the student’s expression 
will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon 
the rights of other students.”30 However, subsequent cases have 
continued to chip away at the First Amendment’s presence in schools by 
broadening the definition of what constitutes a free-speech exempted 
interruption. Bethel School District v. Fraser added another exception to 
students’ speech rights in holding that schools can prohibit the use of 
vulgar and offensive language if the speech is inconsistent with the 
school’s basic educational mission.31 Two years later, Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier added yet another exception by holding that 
otherwise protected student speech can be regulated if it arises in the 
context of school-sponsored activities32 and the school’s censorship is 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”33 This logic can 
be extended to encompass activities that, while technically “off campus,” 
are nevertheless “in-school” activities, such as athletic events, field trips, 
and school bus rides home. 
Most recently, in Canady v. Bossier Parish School Board,34 the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals limited the Tinker analysis as pertaining only to 
specific viewpoint regulation—those instances where a particular 
viewpoint is suppressed while other viewpoints go unchecked.35 Under 
 
 29. Id. at 509 & n.3. 
 30. Id. at 509; see also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 31. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). In Fraser, a high school student delivered a speech containing 
offensive and vulgar sexual innuendos during a school assembly. Id. at 677–78. The Supreme Court 
held for the school district, finding that the vulgar speech could be prohibited. Id. at 683. 
 32. 484 U.S. 260, 262–64 (1988) (The activity was a school newspaper.) . 
 33. Id. at 273. In Kuhlmeier, the school newspaper was publishing articles that dealt with 
teen pregnancy and the effect of divorce on students. Id. at 263. The principal of the school objected 
to this content and removed the pages dealing with that material—consequently removing other 
stories as well. Id. at 263–64 & n.1. The Court upheld the principal’s actions. Id. at 273. 
 34. 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001). In Canady, parents brought an action challenging a 
mandatory uniform policy imposed on all public schools within the district. Id. at 439. 
 35. Id. at 442 (“[Tinker] involves school regulations directed at specific student 
viewpoints.”). Finding the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier tests ill-suited to the case before it, the 
court adopted another test for generally applicable, viewpoint-neutral regulation, which indirectly 
suppresses speech on school campuses: an adaptation of the time, place, and manner analysis and the 
similar test outlined in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), to a school setting. 
Canady, 240 F.3d at 442–43. Specifically, viewpoint regulation occurs when speech is suppressed 
not because of the general subject matter, but because of the specific viewpoint taken by the speaker; 
5SALGADO.FIN.DOC 2/21/2006 4:56:41 PM 
1371] Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing School Safety 
 1379 
Canady, a school policy regulating student speech—specifically their 
manner of dress while on a school’s campus—survives constitutional 
scrutiny if (1) “it furthers an important or substantial government 
interest;” (2) “the interest is unrelated to the suppression of student 
expression;” and (3) “the incidental restrictions on First Amendment 
activities are no more than is necessary to facilitate that interest.”36  
A common denominator among these cases is the “in-school” 
component, whether on campus,37 at an assembly or extra-curricular 
activity,38 or in the school newspaper.39 No Supreme Court case clearly 
answers whether a school can punish student speech that occurs off 
campus and away from a school-sponsored activity.40 However, lower 
courts41 and commentators42 have suggested that student speech 
occurring off campus, without school affiliation, should be treated the 
same as any other fully protected speech since the First Amendment does 
not discriminate between young adults and adults.43 If off-campus and 
out-of-school speech are entitled to the protection of the First 
Amendment—and there is no reason to think otherwise—the operative 
question becomes: what is “off-campus” or “out-of-school” speech? As 
the body of case law44 addressing that question demonstrates, the answer 
is not clear. 
 
for example, allowing speech about the war in Iraq, but singling out and suppressing any speech that 
expressly opposes the fighting.  
 36. Canady, 240 F.3d at 443. Such an analysis is very similar to the content-neutral analysis 
that would be applied in a traditional First Amendment context, interpreting the Canady test’s third 
prong as analogous to narrow tailoring and the school as the government regulator. However, the 
Canady court gave little attention to whether this was the least restrictive alternative and if it was 
sufficiently narrowly tailored—important prongs in the non-school analysis. For example, in 
Schneider v. New Jersey the Court held that an anti-leafletting ordinance meant to prevent littering 
could be replaced by a ban on littering, which would be just as effective. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). 
 37. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Canady, 240 F.3d 437. 
 38. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 39. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273. 
 40. Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School 
Students, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 123, 142. However, it seems logical that schools can take an 
interest in the welfare of students away from the school. This is an important distinction explored 
more in Part IV as an alternative to punishment. 
 41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 42. See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 19, at 271; David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student 
Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 222. 
 43. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44. See infra Part II.B. 
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B. Where the Schoolhouse Gates End: The “In-School” 
and “Out-of-School” Distinction 
 A preliminary step in any school-speech analysis is determining 
whether the school actually possesses jurisdiction regarding the speech. 
This question hinges on whether or not the speech occurred on campus. 
This section discusses the development of and current confusion 
regarding this distinction.  
1. The development of the distinction 
A significant danger of wrongly classifying “out-of-school” speech 
as “in-school” speech is that out-of-school speech is subsequently 
stripped of many of the First Amendment protections it rightfully 
deserves. In Thomas v. Board of Education, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit emphatically held that speech occurring off campus is 
beyond the reach of school officials: “[O]ur willingness to defer to the 
schoolmaster’s expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large 
measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach 
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”45 The school in Thomas suspended 
students for publishing and distributing a magazine off campus that 
contained sexually graphic material.46 The court reasoned that since 
school officials “ventured out of the school yard and into the general 
community where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their 
actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government 
officials in the public arena.”47 In short, the magazine was purely off-
campus speech, and the court held that a “student is free to speak his 
mind when the school day ends.”48 But in Thomas, the court’s decision 
was made easier because none of the magazines actually reached 
campus; when speech created off campus is intentionally or 
unintentionally brought on campus,49 the on-campus/off-campus 
distinction is blurred.50 On one hand, the speech was born well outside 
 
 45. 607 F.2d at 1044–45. 
 46. Id. at 1045–46 & n.3. 
 47. Id. at 1050. 
 48. Id. at 1052. This idea is echoed by the Canady court which emphasized that students 
could wear attire of their own choice when away from school. Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 
240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 49. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 50. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 618–19 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 2530 (2005). 
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school premises—suggesting it is off-campus speech; on the other hand, 
the speech subsequently enters the school’s domain. At that point, does 
the fundamental classification of the speech shift from off-campus 
speech to on-campus speech? 
Many courts have applied standards developed in Tinker and its 
progeny to evaluate off-campus student speech subsequently brought on 
campus by someone other than the speaker.51 Such cases have involved 
“underground” student newspapers distributed off campus,52 student-run 
Web sites created using off-campus computers,53 and writings brought 
on campus by students other than the original author.54 The similarity in 
each of these cases is that the student’s expression was brought on 
campus as a direct consequence of his desire to communicate that 
expression to someone who then brought it on campus.55 For example, in 
Boucher v. School Board, an underground newspaper was distributed on 
campus,56 and in Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, a 
paper was distributed off campus but in very close proximity to the 
school.57 An “on-campus” finding makes sense in both cases since the 
speaker clearly meant for his speech to be disseminated among the 
student body on school grounds. 
In contrast, communication that was never actually brought to 
campus, or was brought to campus inadvertently without intent to 
communicate it, has generally been held to be off-campus speech and 
afforded full First Amendment protection.58 In Porter v. Ascension 
Parish School Board, for example, Adam Porter showed his violent 
drawing of the school under siege only to family and a friend at home, 
and it was only by chance that his brother unwittingly took it on 
 
 51. Id. at 619. 
 52. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 822, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. Houston 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1072, 1075–76 (5th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
462 F.2d 960, 964, 970–75 (5th Cir. 1972); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1389, 
1392 (D. Minn. 1987). 
 53. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink 
v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177, 1180–82 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 54. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2002); 
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448–49, 455 (W.D. Penn. 2001). 
 55. See supra notes 52–54. 
 56. 134 F.3d at 822–23. 
 57. 475 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 58. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 2530 (2005); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1979); Klein v. Smith, 
635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986). 
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campus.59 The court held that the situation in Porter was off-campus 
expression.60 In Klein v. Smith, a student gave “the finger” to his teacher 
in the parking lot of a restaurant while both were away from campus.61 
Again, the court held that it was off-campus expression.62 
2. The problems inherent to the current distinction 
The cases discussed above suggest an obvious distinction between 
on-campus and off-campus speech: if the speech is made on campus or 
brought to campus according to the will of the speaker, it is on-campus 
speech and, thus, is afforded a lower level of free-speech protection.63 
Unfortunately, no such bright-line rule actually exists. Many of the 
courts finding speech made off campus and later brought on campus to 
be on-campus speech have relied on the concept of off-campus speech 
producing on-campus effects rather than emphasizing whether the 
student intended that speech to actually reach campus.64 Indeed, even in 
its broad defense of off-campus speech, the Second Circuit in Thomas v. 
Board of Education left open the possibility that school administrators 
could punish students who “incite[] substantial disruption within the 
school from some remote locale.”65 Less clear, however, is whether 
speech actually needs to make it on campus to “incite substantial 
disruption”66 or whether speech that remains entirely off campus, but 
 
 59. Porter, 393 F.3d at 615. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 635 F. Supp. at 1441. 
 62. Id. Klein’s expression was not in a fixed form and could not be subsequently brought 
onto campus, rendering the on-campus/off-campus distinction clearer than in the cases where an 
expression originates off campus yet eventually finds its way on campus. Unless photographed or 
otherwise recorded, making an obscene gesture—as he did—is not fixed in a transportable medium. 
 63. One could also reasonably add “speech relating to a class assignment” to this category. 
For example, if one student in a class takes a test early for personal reasons and later tells other 
students (while off campus) what is on the exam before they have taken it, a school could 
presumably discipline the student for that speech. Such speech directly undermines the core purposes 
of the school. 
 64. See Calvert, supra note 19, at 248–49. 
 65. 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 & n.17 (2d Cir. 1979). It seems implicit in the rule that such 
incitement would be accompanied by intentional communication by the speaker. 
 66. Many of the school shootings that have occurred suggest scenarios in which off-campus 
speech may indeed cause on-campus disruption, particularly communication plotting or encouraging 
school shootings. However, as we shall see in the later discussion, this can be analyzed best under 
true threat analysis. 
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affects students who themselves go on campus, falls under this 
umbrella.67 
Given the duty of administrators to prevent disturbances,68 Tinker 
allows school officials to act before disruption actually occurs.69 Since 
forecasting such disruption in advance is unmistakably difficult to do, 
Tinker does not require certainty that disruption will occur. Instead, the 
existence of “facts which might reasonably lead school officials to 
forecast substantial disruption” is sufficient.70 In the aftermath of 
Columbine, Red Lake, and other school shootings, much of what nervous 
educators perceive as potentially inciting “substantial disruption” may 
actually be harmless (while students posing a legitimate safety danger 
will conceal their speech or remain silent for fear of punishment).71 
Virtually anything can now set off warning lights—educators treat a 
satirical website parodying school administration72 the same way they 
treat a legitimate danger. Consequently, without a clear test for what can 
potentially cause “substantial disruption,” virtually any off-campus 
expression may be characterized and legally defined as on-campus 
expression.  
Such a categorization is potentially overinclusive, and courts 
disagree about what to treat as on campus.73 For example, in Emmett v. 
Kent School District, the federal district court held that a Web site 
created off campus—even though the intended audience was 
undoubtedly connected to the high school—was “entirely outside of the 
school’s supervision or control.”74 Less than a year later, however, in 
Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, another district court 
rendered a decision incongruous with the others.75 A student composed 
and distributed to his friends via email a top-ten list critical of a 
 
 67. An example of such speech might be the scenario discussed in footnote 63, where a 
student shares information about an exam. 
 68. See generally Alison Bethel, Keeping Schools Safe: Why Schools Should Have an 
Affirmative Duty To Protect Students from Harm by Other Students, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 183 (2004) 
(discussing duty to prevent school violence wherever possible); see also infra Part II.D. 
 69. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Karp v. 
Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 70. Karp, 477 F.2d at 175 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 514 (1969)). 
 71. See discussion on post-Columbine paranoia infra Part III. 
 72. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 73. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 74. 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090. 
 75. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
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teacher.76 The court examined the list under the Tinker analysis since 
“the overwhelming weight of authority” had examined such speech 
under Tinker, and because the list “was brought on campus, albeit by an 
unknown person.”77  
Given the uncertainty among the courts as to whether the speaker 
must actually intend for the speech to make it onto campus—the 
students’ actions in Emmett and Killion were virtually identical, but with 
contrasting outcomes—administrators lack clear guidance in determining 
what speech falls within their jurisdiction.78 In the absence of clear, easy-
to-follow guidelines, complete suppression of student speech unpopular 
with educators becomes the default. Troubled students, deprived of any 
acceptable outline to vent their frustrations, could hide their feelings, 
which could possibly lead to violence. The problem of ascertaining 
where a school’s jurisdiction begins and ends is further exacerbated by 
the prevalent approach for evaluating potentially violent student speech: 
relying on traditional legal threat analysis and a general response 
procedure that favors punishment and suppression over help and 
encouragement. 
III. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL THREAT ANALYSIS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF WARNING SIGNS AND GUIDELINES TO EVALUATE 
WHEN A DANGER ACTUALLY EXISTS 
Providing for school safety is, in some ways, a complex dance: on 
the one hand, it is necessary to allow enough freedom of speech to 
students so that they can express themselves adequately; on the other 
hand, however, it is critical that educators respond appropriately when 
warning signs suggest potential danger is on the horizon. Once the initial 
question of whether or not the school possesses jurisdiction is answered, 
the speech must be analyzed to determine if a danger exists. This Section 
discusses (A) traditional threat analysis—based on the intent and 
expectation of causing fear—and why such analysis is ineffective and 
overinclusive in addressing adolescent speech, (B) the important role of 
warning signs and the danger posed by zero-tolerance policies, and (C) 
guidelines developed to help determine when a legitimate danger exists. 
 
 76. Id. at 448–49. 
 77. Id. at 455. 
 78. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 2530 (2005). Clearly, off-campus speech must be dealt with differently than on-campus 
speech. However, if administrators have no certain way of distinguishing between the two types, 
they will likely treat all speech as on-campus speech under the “substantial disruption” theory. 
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A. The Failure of Traditional Threat Analysis in the School Context 
In free-speech jurisprudence, various categories of unprotected 
speech exist, including incitement,79 false statements of fact,80 
obscenity,81 child pornography,82 fighting words,83 and threats.84 
“Threat” analysis is generally employed to determine whether student 
speech can be suppressed, but the very undertaking of such an analysis is 
rife with error. The traditional legal framework is designed around adult 
speech and does not accommodate adolescent speech. Consequently, it 
singles out speech that might be harmless (over-inclusiveness) while 
failing to include speech that, though falling short of a legal “threat” 
classification, provides warning signs of potential violence85 and 
urgently needs to be dealt with (under-inclusiveness). This Comment 
contends that in cases of adolescent speech, it is necessary to supplant 
the traditional legal threat analysis with guidelines that accommodate the 
unique characteristics of youth. Instead of seeking a legal analysis to 
determine what speech can be punished, educators need to apply a 
qualitative analysis to determine which students need help. 
In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional threat 
analysis, it is necessary first to explain the fundamentals of that analysis 
and how it has been applied—ineffectively—to adolescent speech. 
1. Fundamentals of threat analysis 
A genuine threat is not protected speech under the First 
Amendment.86 Exactly what constitutes a genuine threat, however, as 
opposed to a harmless expression of frustration or anger, is a difficult 
 
 79. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 80. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 81. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 82. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 83. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571–72 (1942). 
 84. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705 (1969). 
 85. For example, before the shooting rampage at Red Lake High School, sixteen-year-old 
Jeffrey Weise posted online a disturbing violent flash animation depicting a shooting. See School 
Killer’s Animated Terror, supra note 13. The flash animation would not satisfy any of the required 
prongs to be a threat, yet was nevertheless a very legitimate warning sign, which should have 
triggered a response. 
 86. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08. 
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distinction.87 According to Watts v. United States, the threat must be a 
realistic, actual threat and not mere hyperbole.88 In Watts, a protester 
declared that if the military made him “carry a rifle the first man [he] 
want[ed] to get in [his] sights [was] L.B.J.”89 Emphasizing the unique 
language of the political arena, the Supreme Court held that such an 
announcement amounted to no more than hyperbole90 and, consequently, 
was protected speech outside the threat category.91 The Court did not 
provide a more comprehensive definition of what a true threat92 is until 
Virginia v. Black in 2003.93 
Addressing threat doctrine in the context of cross burning, the Black 
Court defined true threats as encompassing “those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”94 However, the Court noted that actual intent to carry out 
the threat is not required.95 The only intent necessary is the “intent of 
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”96 As an initial 
threshold, the speaker must intend to convey the purported threat; the 
 
 87. This is especially true for school administrators unversed in the intricacies of First 
Amendment law. 
 88. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 89. Id. at 706. 
 90. As will be shown in subsequent analysis, just as the Court afforded particular 
consideration to hyperbole given the nature of the political arena, it would make sense to afford 
similar consideration to hyperbole given the nature of youthful communications. 
 91. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 92. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 283, 294–95 (2001); Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First 
Amendment Framework for Educators Who Seek To Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 635, 642–43 (2000). 
 93. 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 94. Id. at 359. 
 95. Id. at 359–60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”). 
 96. Id. at 360. Watts, with its exception for hyperbolic speech, assumes that hyperbolic 
speech is not intended to place the recipient in any such fear and does not have that effect on the 
recipient. This is a somewhat dubious distinction since the mere fact that speech is hyperbolic does 
not exonerate it from causing fear on the part of the recipient: “I’m going to rip your head off and 
gut you” certainly is no less fear-inducing than a less-hyperbolic “I’m going to inflict physical harm 
upon you.” If anything, the hyperbolic speech will likely engender greater fear than more sedate 
expression. More likely, what the Court means, in distinguishing hyperbolic speech from other 
threats, is to exclude those instances in which the speaker has no intent to cause harm or even fear 
thereof, but speaks in terms that might be so construed if taken out of context. Context, in fact, is 
crucial: The phrase “I’m going to kill him,” has very different meanings when spoken by an 
employee engaged in good natured pranks with a friend, than when uttered by a laid-off employee 
and directed towards the boss who decided his fate. 
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lack of intent to communicate the threat destroys the threat classification 
and renders the communication fully protected under the First 
Amendment.97 
Unfortunately, Black failed to resolve a divide among the circuits 
regarding how best to parse true threats from protected speech once the 
threshold question of whether the speaker intended to communicate the 
speech is met.98 Courts typically adopt an objective test focusing on 
whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as a 
serious expression of intent to cause a present or future harm.99 The 
courts disagree, however, as to the person from whose viewpoint the 
statement should be interpreted:100 a reasonable person standing in the 
shoes of the speaker,101 or a reasonable person standing in the shoes of 
the recipient.102 
In United States v. Dinwiddie,103 the Eighth Circuit, adhering to the 
reasonable recipient standard, set forth a list of factors regarding how a 
reasonable recipient would view a purported threat: (1) the reaction of 
those who heard the alleged threat; (2) whether the threat was 
conditional; (3) whether the person who made the threat communicated it 
directly to the object of the threat; (4) whether the speaker had a history 
of making threats against the person purportedly threatened; and (5) 
whether the recipient had a reason to believe that the speaker had a 
propensity to engage in violence.104 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has 
adhered to the reasonable speaker standard in defining a true threat test 
as “whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would 
be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement 
as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.”105 
 
 97. Id. at 359. 
 98. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 102. United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 103. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 104. Id. at 925. 
 105. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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2. Struggles in applying the analysis to adolescent speech 
Initially it makes sense, particularly in the school context, to follow 
the reasonable speaker approach given the risk that a speaker’s 
constitutional rights may otherwise “turn on a recipient’s unique 
sensitivity or characteristic that is, or may be, unknown to the 
speaker.”106 What defines a “reasonable recipient” in the educational 
context is debatable,107 and it would be difficult for a student to know 
whether a given teacher or administration is particularly prone to fear of 
school violence. An excellent illustration of this concept is found in 
LaVine v. Blaine School District.108 
In the summer before his junior year of high school, James LaVine 
wrote a poem, “Last Words,” which was a first-person account of a 
violent high school shooting.109 He showed the poem to his mother who 
warned him not to show it to any teachers because they might 
overreact.110 James failed to heed his mother’s advice, and several 
months later he showed the poem to his English teacher and asked her 
opinion.111 Alarmed, she contacted a school counselor and set into 
motion a chain of events leading to James’s emergency expulsion from 
school.112  
The quick and decisive reaction by the administration to what, in 
retrospect, posed no actual danger demonstrates the problems of using a 
reasonable recipient standard in the school context.113 Had the court 
 
 106. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 
United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997)). However, applying the reasonable 
speaker test requires ascertaining the mindset of a reasonable teenager. Such a requirement may be 
difficult for courts: need the student take into consideration the heightened scrutiny of educators due 
to school shootings and violence? If so, might that produce self-censorship and a chilling effect on 
student speech? 
 107. The definition would hinge on various factors such as recent violence and the perceived 
threat, in general, to the school’s safety. 
 108. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001). It is noteworthy that the events leading to this case 
occurred before Columbine, but after the series of school shootings that began putting administrators 
on edge. 
 109. Id. at 983–84. 
 110. Id. at 984. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 984–87. 
 113. Admittedly, even if the school wrongly perceived it as a threat, that serves only to show 
that some school administrators are not reasonable in their reactions to speech of this sort. However, 
this occurrence does serve to underscore the difficulty in determining what actually constitutes a 
“reasonable recipient.” Some may argue that knowing that they could get kicked out of school for 
poems that could be perceived as threatening school violence could persuade students to avoid that 
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based its determination entirely upon the recipient’s reaction, the speech 
would have been deemed a threat. It also acknowledged, however, the 
necessary discretion afforded to administrators in responding quickly 
given the grave danger that a slower response may create.114 
Admittedly, the reasonable speaker standard is potentially 
problematic as well—what exactly is a reasonable teenager, if such a 
thing even exists? Must a “reasonable teenage speaker” take into 
consideration the potential overreaction of educators, as James LaVine’s 
mother suggested when she warned him to not show his work to any 
teachers? If so, would this trigger undue self-censorship and a chilling 
effect on student speech? Topics susceptible to hypersensitivity in 
schools, such as death or conflict, are subjects that have been addressed 
in art and literature for centuries.115 If students cannot address such 
topics116 for fear of a teacher’s reaction, speech rights are clearly 
implicated.117 While it is true LaVine’s rights in composing the poem 
were unaffected until he took the poem to school, it must be remembered 
that the best resource typically available to a teenager seeking to expand 
his or her creative abilities is the high school English teacher. 
 
type of inflammatory material in schools. That is the very point of this analysis and Comment; 
however, the fact that a given material might be considered inflammatory does not mean that it is not 
protected speech. The recipient standard would result in unduly severe self-censorship for fear of 
punishment, restrict burgeoning artistic abilities, and suppress warning signs that need to be brought 
to the surface. 
 114. The court held that, given the risk of “substantial disruption of or material interference 
with school activities,” the school’s actions were justified. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990–92. 
 115. One need only look to the works of Shakespeare, or paintings by the Old Masters, to 
confirm that death and conflict, along with love and God, have been primary themes of art for 
centuries. 
 116. Some may argue that while these topics may be legitimate artistic subjects, the treatment 
by the students is generally remarkably different than the more traditional, academically-sanctioned 
means of expression. This argument fails, however, because art, offensive to some, is often held up 
as genius by others. For example, one need look no further than the borderline pornographic 
photography of Robert Mapplethorpe and the often vulgar poetry of Allen Ginsburg. 
 117. Importantly, James LaVine presented his violent poem to his English teacher in a creative 
writing context. He had written a poem about a timely topic of interest to youth and sincerely sought 
feedback from a teacher he respected. If students cannot freely express themselves at the very least 
in what is an undeniably creative context, where can they express themselves? If a high school 
student were to write a scholarly research paper similar to this Comment, would that trigger an 
immediate response on the part of educators? The answer seems to be “perhaps,” further establishing 
the problems of a chilling effect on speech that might result if we have to rely on the student gauging 
what reaction their communication will cause. Admittedly, this author’s viewpoint is one which 
undeniably places great value on creativity and the importance of free speech to cultivate it. Other 
perspectives certainly exist, but are not treated in this Comment. 
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Two recent circuit cases attempted to clarify the true threat doctrine 
in the school setting but arrived at contrasting outcomes. In Doe v. 
Pulaski County Special School District, eighth grader Josh Mahan 
showed violent, misogynistic, “Eminem-like” rants against his ex-
girlfriend to a friend who secretly stole the letters and shared them with 
the girlfriend while on campus.118 The Eighth Circuit, in a sharply 
divided en banc decision overturning the panel decision, found that the 
letters constituted a true threat and were not protected.119 The majority 
acknowledged that a speaker must intentionally or knowingly 
communicate a statement to someone before the speaker can be 
punished.120 Finding that the standard is satisfied if the speaker 
communicates the statement “to the object of the purported threat or to a 
third party,”121 the court found that Mahan manifested the intent to 
convey the threat by allowing his friend to read it.122 The majority 
applied the reasonable recipient standard and found that the speech was a 
true threat given the impact it had on the ultimate recipient: the girl to 
whom the “threat” was directed.123 This analysis was independent of the 
threshold question of whether the speech was on-campus (having been 
shown to the girl by a friend). 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter v. Ascension Parish School 
Board124 is a stark contrast with Pulaski. In Porter, the facts of which 
served as the introduction of this Comment,125 the Fifth Circuit held that 
since Adam Porter showed his violent drawing of the school under siege 
only to his mother, his younger brother, and a friend, all within the 
home,126 he did not intentionally communicate the expression to anyone 
 
 118. 306 F.3d 616, 619–20 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit decided the case 
shortly before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Black, but has been cited by courts interpreting student 
speech in the time since Black. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 613, 617 
(5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2530 (2005); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 
(E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 119. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 618, 626–27. 
 120. Id. at 624 (citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 121. Id. (citing United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831–32 (10th Cir. 1986); Hawaii v. 
Chung, 862 P.2d 1063, 1071–73 (Haw. 1993)). 
 122. Id. at 624–25. The dissent argued that such logic “unreasonably stretches facts and law” 
and that Mahan did not intend to communicate the threat. Id. at 629 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 624–26. 
 124. 393 F.3d 608. 
 125. See supra Part I. 
 126. 393 F.3d at 617. 
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else, and thus failed to meet that initial threshold.127 In Pulaski, the 
expression was shared only with one friend, also within the home, yet the 
Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.128 
Given the inconsistency of the Circuits in determining if a speaker 
has intentionally communicated a threat, school administrators lack a 
clear precedent upon which to model their own interpretation of what 
constitutes a threat.129 Consequently, administrators are prone to classify 
virtually everything as a threat, regardless of its actual nature, and then 
allow the courts to sort it out later at the expense of taxpayers.130 This is 
an inadequate remedy since students have only a finite time in high 
school. The immediate result of this trend is that students are stripped of 
First Amendment protections until courts restore their rights. An 
excellent example of this problem is embodied in the increased 
popularity of zero-tolerance policies in many schools. 
B. Warning Signs and the Zero-Tolerance Policies 
That Risk Suppressing Them 
One of the most significant developments affecting student speech 
rights is the increased adoption of “zero tolerance”131 policies that 
empower school districts to automatically extend severe punishments in 
disciplining students for even a slight infraction of school rules regarding 
guns, alcohol, threats, and so forth.132 Though they often relate to non-
 
 127. Id. at 618. 
 128. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619, 624. 
 129. As seen in the discussion of on-campus and off-campus speech, administrators are again 
denied a clear rule to follow in that regard. 
 130. See, e.g., Torsten Ove, Court Rules School Policy Violates Pupils’ Free Speech, 
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 2003, at E7 (describing a $60,000 settlement stemming from a 
lawsuit over student expression). 
 131. According to a recent A.B.A. Report, 
“Zero tolerance” is the phrase that describes America’s response to student misbehavior. 
Zero tolerance means that a school will automatically and severely punish a student for a 
variety of infractions. While zero tolerance began as a Congressional response to students 
with guns, gun cases are the smallest category of school discipline cases. Indeed, zero 
tolerance covers the gamut of student misbehavior, from including “threats” in student 
fiction to giving aspirin to a classmate. Zero tolerance has become a one-size-fits-all 
solution to all the problems that schools confront. It has redefined students as criminals, 
with unfortunate consequences. 
RALPH C. MARTIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY: REPORT (2001), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html. 
 132. See Lynda Hils, “Zero Tolerance” for Free Speech, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 365 (2001); 
Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 40, 40–46, 113. 
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speech behavioral elements exceeding the scope of this Comment, such 
policies illustrate one extreme approach in reaction to school violence. 
In theory, a zero-tolerance policy for any speech considered to be 
threatening can help rid schools of potentially violent students.133 
Unfortunately, “these same policies [can] stifle a young voice that may 
be crying for help, or trying to show society its inadequacies, or merely 
expressing anger through creative expressions.”134 The American Bar 
Association officially opposes zero-tolerance policies as “one size fits 
all” policies that “eliminate the common sense that comes with discretion 
and, at great cost to society and to children and families, do little to 
improve school safety.”135 Such polices have enjoyed increasing 
popularity136 despite the fact that homicides in school are, in fact, very 
rare events. A recent congressional report asserts that “[i]n the case of 
youth violence, it is important to note that, statistically speaking, schools 
are among the safest places for children to be.”137 In any given year, a 
student is three to four times more likely to be hit by lightning than to be 
the victim of violence in school.138 Yet an atmosphere of fear has 
become pervasive in the nation’s schools.139 Fueled by media hype, fear 
of the unthinkable and, perhaps, a bit of guilt,140 more parents are 
demanding that school boards implement strict policies to deal with kids 
 
 133. MARTIN, supra note 131. 
 134. Hils, supra note 132, at 365. 
 135. MARTIN, supra note 131. 
 136. The general idea seems to be that if any suggestion of violence is summarily cast out of 
the school environment, the school is that much safer. Unfortunately, this logic is flawed, as seen by 
the tragic events following Kip Kinkel’s expulsion from high school, and other similar events. See 
infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. Expulsion does not prevent a student from returning to 
campus with a weapon. In fact, as attested to by many school shootings such as Columbine, the 
shooters did not shoot in the midst of taking classes. Instead, the students typically began shooting as 
soon as they arrived on campus. See, e.g., supra note 16. 
 137. Bipartisan Working Group on Youth Violence, 106th Congress, Final Report, Nov. 17, 
1999, available at 9, http://www.house.gov/scott/bipartisan_working_group 
_youth_violence_106th_final.pdf. Further discussion of this actuality is provided by the A.B.A.: 
Nationwide, statistics gathered by the Justice Policy Institute and the U.S. Department of 
Education show that crime of all sorts is down at public schools since 1990—some 
studies say by as much as 30 percent. Less than 1 percent of all violent incidents 
involving adolescents occur on school grounds. Indeed, a child is three times more likely 
to be struck by lightning than to be killed violently at school. 
MARTIN, supra note 131. 
 138. Johanna Wald, The Failure of Zero Tolerance, SALON, Aug. 29, 2001, 
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/08/29/zero_tolerance/index.html. 
 139. See generally Lewis, supra note 10, at 336.  
 140. Many school shooters came from troubled homes or exhibited warnings signs that went 
unheeded by their parents. 
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who step out of line.141 Unfortunately, the zero-tolerance policies being 
implemented across the country are snaring large numbers of regular kids 
in the broad nets designed to fish for safety threats.142 
Significantly, many school shooters have exhibited warning signs in 
anticipation of the attacks.143 One school shooter wrote a series of 
violent poems before actually committing violence: 
Am I insane 
To want to end this pain 
To want to end my life 
By using a sharp knife 
. . . . 
Am I insane 
Wanting to spill blood like rain 
Sending them all to Hell 
From humanity I’ve fell.144 
The teacher who read the poetry recommended the student receive help, 
but the student did not receive help and subsequently killed two adults at 
his school.145 Another troubled student wrote: 
“Murder” 
It’s my first murder 
I’m at the point of no return 
 
 141. MARTIN, supra note 131. 
 142. Id. (quoting Tebo, supra note 132, at 40, 40–46, 113.). The A.B.A. Report includes 
various examples of students unjustly caught in the net of zero tolerance. The following are two such 
examples: 
 In Ponchatoula Louisiana, a 12-year-old who had been diagnosed with a hyperactive 
disorder warned the kids in the lunch line not to eat all the potatoes, or “I’m going to get 
you.” The student, turned in by the lunch monitor, was suspended for two days. He was 
then referred to police by the principal, and the police charged the boy with making 
“terroristic threats.” He was incarcerated for two weeks while awaiting trial. . . . In 
Denton County, Texas, a 13-year-old was asked to write a “scary” Halloween story for a 
class assignment. When the child wrote a story that talked about shooting up a school, he 
both received a passing grade by his teacher and was referred to the school principal’s 
office. The school officials called the police, and the child spent six days in jail before the 
courts confirmed that no crime had been committed. 
Id. 
 143. See Sarah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed: School and Judicial Analysis in 
Need of Redirection, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 663, 666. 
 144. Id. at 666–67. 
 145. Id. at 667. 
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I look at his body on the floor 
Killing a bastard that deserves to die 
Ain’t nuthin’ like it in the world 
But he sure did bleed a lot.146 
The teacher who received this poem did not tell a counselor or an 
administrator about it. The student proceeded to shoot two students and a 
teacher at his middle school.147 As evidenced by these instances and 
others like them,148 warning signs do exist, and administrators would be 
remiss to ignore them. The appropriate reaction to a warning sign is 
counseling, investigation, and due caution, not punishment. Under a 
zero-tolerance policy, a student would be discouraged from letting any 
school officials see such work, thus limiting the school’s ability to help.  
 In the instances above, the absence of a zero-tolerance policy 
encouraged the students to submit their work and, consequently, the 
warning signs surfaced. The problem came when the warning signs went 
unaddressed. Schools must encourage speech and be prepared to respond 
appropriately when warning signs appear. Had the appropriate authorities 
met with the students and their families and contextualized the poems, 
they could have learned of the legitimate danger and dealt with it, 
thereby averting tragedy. In contrast to these cases in which the warning 
signs surfaced, experience demonstrates that a zero-tolerance policy that 
immediately suspends or expels a student might not actually create a 
safer environment. Consider the following examples. 
Kip Kinkel, a high school freshman, was immediately expelled from 
school after being caught storing a gun in his locker—a clear violation of 
his school’s zero-tolerance policy.149 He murdered both his parents that 
night and returned to school the next day, killing two classmates and 
wounding twenty-five others.150 More than punishment when initially 
caught with the gun, Kip Kinkel needed help, counseling, and 
 
 146. Id. (quoting Youth’s Poems, CINCINATTI POST, Web ed., Nov. 10, 1998, 
http://www.cincypost.com/news/1998/write111098.html.). 
 147. Id. at 668. 
 148. The recent shootings at Red Lake are a particularly disturbing and effective example. In 
the days following the shootings, various warning signs—from a shockingly violent flash animation 
the killer made, to his personal website that suggested school shootings in the near future, and his 
open admiration of Hitler and a previous school shooter—came to light, begging the question: how 
were these warning signs ignored? 
 149. Frontline, The Killer at Thurston High: Chronology, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/kip/cron.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 150. Id. 
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intervention.151 When the school took a hard-line stance with him, he 
reacted violently and the warning sign he exhibited remanifested itself as 
an attack. Granted, it is impossible to know whether the violence would 
still have occurred without the expulsion—it seems illogical to believe 
that the expulsion caused his reaction, rather than merely serving as the 
trigger for what had been long coming. However, the fact remains that 
Kinkel’s actions presented the school with a clear warning sign, and the 
school still chose punishment over counseling. The end result was 
violence. 
In contrast, a seventeen-year-old Arkansas honor student’s college 
scholarship was endangered by a forty-five-day sentence to an alternative 
school when an arbitrary search of his car by school officials revealed no 
drugs, but a scraper and pocketknife that his father had inadvertently left 
the night before after fixing a mirror.152 Despite his desperate father’s 
pleas, the school system adamantly insisted on sustaining its zero-
tolerance policy.153 While both of these examples pertain to a zero-
tolerance policy in the weapons context, the same basic idea is true in a 
speech context as well: zero tolerance is overinclusive so as to unduly 
punish the harmless, while failing to actually prevent violence.  
C. Guidelines To Determine When Danger Exists 
If traditional, legal threat analysis is inadequate, and zero-tolerance 
policies ineffective, the question becomes: how should risks be identified 
in schools? Steps have been taken to properly identify and respond to 
legitimate threats. The United States Secret Service and the United States 
Department of Education jointly produced Threat Assessment in Schools: 
A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe 
School Climates (“Guide”).154 As expected, the joint report upon which 
the Guide was based found that some school attacks may indeed have 
been preventable.155 The resultant Guide represented a modification of 
the Secret Service threat assessment process—first pioneered as a way of 
assessing threats against the President of the United States and other 
protected officials156—based upon findings from the Safe School 
 
 151. Punishment was also certainly appropriate given that Kip Kinkel had a firearm on 
campus. However, even when punishment is appropriate, it should be accompanied by help. 
 152. Wald, supra note 138.  
 153. Id.  
 154. FEIN ET AL., supra note 23. 
 155. Id. at 4. 
 156. Id. at 4–5. 
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Initiative.157 The Guide suggested eleven key questions to use in 
assessing a threat: 
1. What are the student’s motives and goals? 
2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to 
attack? 
3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in [school attacks or 
attackers, weapons, or incidents of mass violence]? 
4. Has the student engaged in attack related behaviors? 
5. Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted 
violence? 
6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or 
despair? 
7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one 
responsible adult? 
8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable or desirable or the 
only way to solve problems? 
9. Is the student’s conversation and “story” consistent with his or her 
actions? 
10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for 
violence? 
11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?158 
A key principle underlying these suggested questions is the 
importance of properly contextualizing each perceived threat or warning 
sign, rather than viewing the incident isolated from other potentially 
mitigating elements such as a happy home life, an even temperament, or 
strong adult role models.159 It is important that school administrators 
deal with each event rationally on a case-by-case basis rather than by 
overreacting or applying the blanket response mandated by a zero-
tolerance policy.160 These proposed questions are not binding law,161 and 
educators are under no legal duty to follow them. However, by using 
 
 157. Id. The Safe School Initiative was a joint study conducted by the Secret Service and the 
Department of Education. The study examined thirty-seven incidents of targeted school violence that 
occurred in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000 when researchers concluded 
their data collection. Id. at 11. 
 158. Id. at 63–66. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 32. 
 161. No court has yet adopted these rules in analysis. 
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questions such as these—as discussed in the following analysis162—and 
by doing so on a case-by-case basis, educators can make considerable 
strides towards improving school safety while continuing to protect 
student speech rights. 
IV. BRIGHT-LINE RULES AND THREAT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES 
It is difficult to achieve a balance between the duty of educators to 
assure the safety of a school and the speech rights of students. The 
perception of school violence may be worse than the reality of school 
violence, but it is nevertheless a valid concern.163 Many past shooters left 
warning signs,164 and, in retrospect, some instances of violence were 
preventable.165 The First Amendment should never be used to insulate 
legitimate threats or warning signs from appropriate response. Educators 
must respond quickly and decisively lest a warning sign be missed and 
another tragic act of violence occur. At the same time, however, it is 
important that students who pose no actual threat not be inadvertently 
caught up in an overly broad net meant to avert the next Columbine or 
Red Lake massacre. Consequently, school administrators’ evaluations of 
student threats and warning signs should be viewed as a two-step 
process: 
(1) determining whether it is within their jurisdiction (the on-campus/off-
campus question), and if so, (2) determining if it actually threatens 
school safety.166 These two clarifications of the law and procedure 
simplify the duty of violence prevention for educators, protect student 
speech, and—through the additional warning signs that will surface in 
the increased flow of student speech—provide for greater school safety. 
 
 162. See infra Part IV. 
 163. School shootings may indeed be rare in proportion to the total number of students 
attending American high schools. However, many other things, such as terrorist attacks, are similarly 
rare in proportion. Such a fact does not detract from the importance of preventing such attacks. 
 164. See Redfield, supra note 143, at 666. 
 165. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4. 
 166. This is a subtle, but important, distinction; determining whether something actually 
“threatens school safety” is distinct from determining whether something is “a threat.” A “threat,” as 
it has been discussed here, is essentially a legal term only, separating a category of speech as less 
protected, regardless of whether or not it actually endangers safety. In contrast, something that 
actually threatens school safety is a very legitimate danger, often foreshadowed by warning signs. 
By focusing exclusively on the legal concept of a “threat,” the real danger to schools is unaddressed. 
Many warnings signs, for example, might not actually be communicated intentionally and would 
thus evade a “threat” classification. 
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A. Bright Line Rules Distinguishing Between 
In-School/Out-of-School Speech 
1. The proposal 
The difference between “in-school” and “out-of-school” speech is 
simple, at least semantically, yet is prone to over-analysis: “in-school,” 
or “on-campus,” means that the speech is physically on campus or at a 
school-sponsored event, and “off-campus” means the speech is 
physically off campus, isolated from any school sponsored event.167 On-
campus speech is speech that occurs on campus or speech that is created 
in a fixed form—writing, drawings, and so forth—off campus and 
brought to campus according to the direct will of its creator.168 This 
definition of on-campus speech excludes speech made in a tangible fixed 
form that remains off campus and speech brought to campus without its 
creator’s direct intent. 
2. How the bright-line distinction will affect the analysis and procedure 
for administrators addressing perceived dangers 
Acknowledging the increasing prevalence of internet 
communication, school administrators should treat any electronic 
communications as off-campus speech unless its speaker downloads it on 
campus or encourages other students to do so.169 This is the same 
standard described in Thomas v. Board of Education, which asserted 
“that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse 
gate.”170 The allowance for “substantial disruption within the school 
from some remote locale”171 has extended the reach of the arm of school 
authority well beyond the schoolhouse gate and into students’ homes.172 
 
 167. See also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. 607 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally 
Calvert, supra note 19, at 271. 
 168. This is my own synthesis of the existing law, as discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, and how 
the law should be ideally. 
 169. Calvert, supra note 19, at 285. 
 170. 607 F.2d at 1044–45. 
 171. Id. at 1052 n.17. 
 172. By haphazardly characterizing otherwise obviously off-campus speech as “on-campus 
speech” because it might potentially trigger on-campus disruption, virtually any off-campus speech 
can be reclassified as on-campus. This is because, given the expansive definition of what is an 
objectively reasonable belief for an educator in the wake of school shootings, virtually any speech 
may be treated as possessing such threatening potential. For instance, giving “the finger” to a teacher 
off campus may so disturb the teacher that he or she is unable to adequately teach class, thus causing 
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Including the “substantial disruption within the school from some 
remote locale” concept in defining on-campus and off-campus speech is 
particularly problematic because of the post-Columbine climate of fear 
lingering in America’s schools.173 Educators are aware of the warning 
signs predicting previous school shootings174 and are prone to interpret 
any hint of violence as foreshadowing on-campus violence, thus putting 
any speech at risk of creating “substantial disruption within the school.” 
Such logic collapses the on- and off-campus distinction: if educators 
plausibly see any mention of violence as potentially causing on-campus 
disruption, the speech is susceptible to on-campus regulation, and student 
speech rights vanish. 
Since on-campus speech is offered less protection than off-campus 
speech,175 wrongly classifying off-campus speech deprives otherwise 
protected speech of the protection it deserves. 176 Lesser protection is 
based on the presumption that the school administration will not reach 
beyond school premises to exact punishment and that students are thus 
able to fully enjoy speech rights away from school.177 This presumption 
is demonstrated, for example, in the context of school uniforms.178 
In Canady v. Bassier Parish School Board, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that while “students are restricted from wearing clothing of their choice 
at school, [they] remain free to wear what they want after school 
hours.”179 If a school policy mandated specific student dress at all times, 
in or out of school, it would not pass constitutional muster.180 Yet, with 
 
on-campus disruption. Alternately, rumors of such an incident occurring could lead to a widespread 
lack of respect within the school for that teacher, again leading to disruption when the teacher is 
unable to control the classroom. 
 173. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Such fear was no doubt reinvigorated by the 
Red Lake shootings. 
 174. See Redfield, supra note 143, at 666. 
 175. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding regulation 
of student speech that is related to school sponsored activities); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986) (upholding regulation of student speech that is lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly 
offensive); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibiting 
viewpoint-specific regulations unless the regulated speech substantially interferes with the work of 
the school); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding regulations 
which further substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of student expression). 
 176. See supra Part II.B. 
 177. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Canady, 240 F.3d at 443. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Such a regulation would prevent students from expressing themselves through their attire, 
a practice which the Canady court assumed to be valid expression. Id. at 443. 
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regard to student speech, the “potential disruption” standard amounts to 
precisely such omnipresent enforcement. If school administrators 
regulate a student’s off-campus expression as on-campus speech by 
virtue of “potential disruption,” the in-school context will be extended to 
the out-of-school context and the student has no forum, on campus or off, 
to express himself. 
Of course, freedom of speech is not absolute,181 and a legitimate 
threat is not protected from prosecution,182 whether on or off campus. 
When such speech exists entirely off campus, however, it should still be 
treated properly as off-campus speech183 and be under the jurisdiction of 
law enforcement instead of school administration. The law provides 
remedies for threats made in any locale, and if the threat is legitimate, 
police can intervene.184 Educators can, and should, still take nonpunitive 
steps to reach out to that student and prevent violence. They can allow 
off-campus law enforcement to address legitimate threats and use their 
unique vantage point as educators to help a student without resorting to 
punishment as a weapon. Consequently, a clear line of demarcation can 
be established between on-campus and off-campus speech that expressly 
designates speech neither created on nor intentionally brought to campus 
as off-campus speech.185 Such a clarification will better enable educators 
to make quick, decisive appraisals of situations that arise186 while 
sparing the school district the litigation expenses that could otherwise 
result.187 A clear delineation of off-campus and on-campus speech—such 
as that proposed188—will better enable educators to delegate 
responsibility for threatening off-campus speech to appropriate law 
 
 181. See supra notes 86–105 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 183. This does not mean that warning signs should be ignored. It merely means that if it is a 
threat, the police should be notified. If it is a warning sign, appropriate, nonpunitive steps should be 
taken to help the student and solve the problem. Punishment is not the cure for warning signs.  
 184. See Calvert, supra note 19, at 285 (articulating that “off-campus remedies exist for off-
campus expression”). 
 185. Punishing a student who cheats, for example, by sharing answers with his classmates, 
would not be implicated by this standard since such behavior would be punished as conduct—
cheating—rather than as speech. 
 186. By applying clear standards to determine if the school has jurisdiction, administrators 
will be able to delegate off-campus enforcement to the police and focus their own time and resources 
on on-campus issues. 
 187. Supra note 130. 
 188. See Part IV.A. Speech that occurs on campus, or is created in a fixed form off campus 
and subsequently brought to campus according to the direct will of its creator, is on-campus speech. 
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enforcement agencies who can investigate further.189 As a result, school 
resources will be available to address actual on-campus issues, rather 
than wasting time and effort unnecessarily policing off-campus activity. 
Ideally, a clear definition of on-campus versus off-campus speech 
would be established via Supreme Court precedent.190 In the absence of 
such a precedent, however, school districts—or even state legislatures—
can proceed in establishing internal rules governing and defining the on-
campus/off-campus distinction.191 By establishing a clear definition that 
classifies speech neither created on nor intentionally brought to campus 
as off-campus speech, the district or legislature will be operating 
comfortably within the parameters already established by courts192 that 
immunize the jurisdictional component of the school response against 
extensive litigation.193 Educators will be better able to focus on the 
remaining speech that is properly classified as on-campus, which will 
lead to administrators missing fewer warning signs and paying more 
careful attention to troubled students. Of course, administrators will still 
need to evaluate that on-campus speech. It is in that regard that the 
implementation of threat assessment guidelines will be beneficial.194 
 
 189. Police agencies, unencumbered by the educational tasks faced by schools, can likely 
perform a more in-depth, comprehensive threat assessment. Furthermore, whereas students can be 
expelled or suspended without due process, any police action is subject to due process, assuring a 
greater protection of the students’ rights. 
 190. As witnessed by the problems of dueling circuits, any judicial precedent short of the 
Supreme Court may merely add to the confusion faced by educators. See supra notes 73–78 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Emmett and Killion decisions). 
 191. Such internal rules have already been adopted with respect to zero-tolerance policies and 
other measures. See the discussion of zero-tolerance policies in Part III. 
 192. See Part II.B. 
 193. Contrast this with the litigation discussed throughout this Comment. 
 194. It would also be an excellent idea for law enforcement and courts to adopt similar 
guidelines in evaluating threats made by juveniles. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the 
adoption of such policies would recognize the significant differences between adult and adolescent 
styles of communication. As discussed at greater length in the next Part, adolescent communication 
is inevitably colored by a variety of variables, ranging from popular culture to typical adolescent 
stresses, anxieties, and insecurities that accompany the teen years. 
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B. The Implementation of Threat Assessment Guidelines 
in Lieu of the Traditional “Threat” Analysis 
1. The proposal 
To properly evaluate student threats, a more comprehensive system 
of threat evaluation is needed.195 An ideal policy or set of guidelines will 
resemble the eleven questions set forth by the Secret Service and 
Department of Education.196 The questions represent a multi-faceted 
approach securely placing a student’s expression within the larger 
context of his life rather than isolating the speech from all other variables 
and interpreting it through a prism darkened by fear of school violence. 
The inclusion of language addressing and acknowledging the inherently 
hyperbolic nature of adolescent speech as well as the influence of 
popular culture, particularly music, on their verbal expression would also 
 
 195. In addition to the Secret Service proposed questions, other approaches exist. The National 
School Safety Center created a profile of behaviors that could indicate a youth’s propensity for 
violence against others based on characteristics of those who have already committed such crimes. 
Checklist of Characteristics of Youth Who Have Caused School-Associated Violent Deaths, National 
School Safety Center, http://www.nssc1.org/reporter/checklist.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
 “The 20-item checklist includes drug abuse, tantrums, threats, depression, truancy, cruelty to 
animals and a fascination with weapons and violence that spills over into schoolwork.” Mike Anton 
& Lisa Levitt Ryckman, In Hindsight Signs of Danger Were Apparent, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 2, 
1999, at 4A. Such profiles, however, can be problematic since they often apply to many teenagers 
who never become violent—every loner sitting alone at lunch or heavy-metal fan dressed in black is 
not a potential shooter. A report by the U.S. Surgeon General asserts that “[n]o single risk factor or 
set of risk factors is powerful enough to predict with certainty that youths will become violent.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 61 
(2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/index.html. 
The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Critical Incident Response Group also published its findings regarding threat 
evaluation. The report states in part, 
In the shock-wave of recent school shootings, [the severe] reaction may be 
understandable, but it is exaggerated—and perhaps dangerous, leading to potential 
underestimation of serious threats, overreaction to less serious ones, and unfairly 
punishing or stigmatizing students who are in fact not dangerous. A school that treats all 
threats as equal falls into the fallacy formulated by Abraham Maslow: “If the only tool 
you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.” 
Mary Ellen O’Toole, CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT 
ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 5 (2000) available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/ 
school/school2.pdf. The report defines a true threat as “an expression of intent to do harm or act out 
violently against someone or something.” Id. at 6. Unfortunately, such a simple definition would be 
just as problematic to free speech as the current approaches courts use. Further, it might be 
underinclusive regarding safety as it fails to consider other factors that indicate potential violence. 
 196. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 63–66. 
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be helpful.197 The impact of violent music on adolescent expression is 
pertinent and also should be considered.198 In short, all violence is not 
created equal. Educators and courts need a clear, uniform way to 
distinguish true threats and actual warning signs from violent yet 
harmless adolescent speech. 
2. How it will affect the procedure and analysis  
In order to explain how the guidelines will affect the procedure and 
analysis, one must look to the unique nature of adolescent speech. Most 
teenagers communicate differently than adults. The teen years are a 
difficult period punctuated with bouts of self-doubt, insecurity, and anger 
toward authority.199 This phenomenon is emphasized by many teens’ 
tendency to speak in hyperbole, characterizing each event in their lives as 
critical, pivotal, or otherwise earth-shattering.200 Teens’ verbal 
communication—both oral and written—is often colored by the media 
they consume.201 “Today’s lingo is largely a by-product of hip hop, 
filtered through rap music with the predictable undertow of anti-
mainstream culture.”202 “Let’s bounce” means “let’s leave,” jewelry is 
referred to as “bling bling,” money as “chedda,” and friends are 
“dawg[s].”203 Given the increasingly violent tone of music,204 the 
 
 197. See infra notes 200–09 and accompanying text. 
 The impact of music with lyrics promoting violence on adolescent behavior, though briefly 
discussed below, exceeds the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., An Examination of the Entertainment 
Industry’s Efforts To Curb Children’s Exposure to Violent Content: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 
(2001); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 195, at 85–94; TELEVISION VIOLENCE 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (James T. Hamilton ed., 1998). See generally Robert Corn-Revere, Regulating 
TV Violence: The FCC’s National Rorschach Test, COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 1. 
 198. See, e.g., infra notes 200–09 and accompanying text. 
 199. See Kelly O’Rourke, “I Have To Change!” The Role of the Adolescent in the Family, in 
Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute, in CURRICULUM UNIT: THE FAMILY IN LITERATURE (1986), 
available at http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1986/1/ 
86.01.07.x.html. 
 200. See generally Raymond W. Gibbs, Irony in Talk Among Friends, 15 METAPHOR & 
SYMBOL 5 (2000). 
 201. See generally Michael Newman, I Represent Me: Identity Construction in a Teenage Rap 
Crew, 44 TEX. LINGUISTIC FORUM 388 (2001), available at http://studentorgs.utexas.edu/salsa/ 
salsaproceedings/salsa9/papers/newman.pdf. 
 202. See Jennifer Wells, Generation Rap: A Pocket Lexicon of Teen Lingo, TODAY’S PARENT, 
Aug. 2003, at 87, available at http://www.todaysparent.com/preteen/ 
behaviordevelopment/article.jsp?content=20030708_110619_892. 
 203. Id. 
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persuasion of popular media on teens’ thoughts inevitably injects an 
undercurrent of violence into many teens’ communication—an 
undercurrent which, though probably just harmless imitation of their 
favorite musician, may alarm already nervous educators. 
In the song Kim, popular rapper Eminem graphically depicted the 
fictional murder of his real-life wife.205 Amidst the torrent of profanity 
riddled lyrics depicting the wife’s violent death, Eminem included 
various disturbing references. For example: 
So now they both dead and you slash your own throat 
So now it’s double homicide and suicide with no note 
. . . . 
You can’t run from me Kim 
It’s just us, nobody else!  
You’re only making this harder on yourself 
Ha! Ha! Got’cha!  
[screaming] 
Ha! Go ahead yell! 
Here I’ll scream with you! 
AH SOMEBODY HELP! 
Don’t you get it b____, no one can hear you? 
. . . . 
You were supposed to love me 
[sound of Kim choking] 
NOW BLEED! B____ BLEED! 
BLEED! B____ BLEED! BLEED!206 
The album in which Kim appeared, The Marshall Mathers LP, sold 
nearly eight million copies, making it the second best selling album of 
2000,207 and won a Grammy award for best rap album.208 
 
 204. Rap music has grown increasingly violent over the past decades, evolving from relatively 
innocuous artists such as Grandmaster Flash and the Sugarhill Gang, to more sinister acts such as 
N.W.A. and 2Pac, to recent performers such as Eminem and 50 Cent, who often boasts of his violent 
background and the number of times he has been shot.  
 205. For a discussion of the song, see Toure, Recordings: The Marshall Mathers LP, ROLLING 
STONE, July 6, 2000, at 135 available at http://www.rollingstone.com/ 
reviews/album/_/id/315749. 
 206. EMINEM, Kim, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Aftermath Records 2000). Lyrics are 
available at http://www.anysonglyrics.com/lyrics/e/eminem/kim.htm. 
 207. Record Sales Up 4% in 2000—Despite Napster & MP3.com, AVREV.COM, Jan. 3, 2000, 
http://www.audiorevolution.com/news/0101/03.soundscan.shtml. In total sales, Eminem trailed only 
teen-pop group ‘N Sync. Id. 
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Not surprisingly, the lyrics of Kim are comparable to the letters 
written by eighth grader Josh Mahan in Pulaski.209 Many of Mahan’s 
lyrics, written during the summer of 2000210 when Eminem’s album 
ruled the music charts, are strikingly similar to Kim: 
My hatred and aggression will go towards you, you better run  
b____, cuz I can’t control what I do. I’ll murder you before you can 
think twice, cut you up and use you for decoration to look nice. . . .211 
While not savory, the lyrics reflect the musical tastes of a generation. 
Yet, despite this seemingly obvious imitation of a teenager’s favorite 
musician, the school administration expelled Josh from school and the 
Eighth Circuit deemed the song a true threat.212 Had an adult written 
such lyrics, as Eminem did, it might indeed be more appropriate to treat 
it as a valid threat. Of course, Eminem instead won a Grammy.213 
However, it would be reasonable to conclude that the eighth grader was 
merely frustrated by a breakup with his girlfriend and was expressing his 
feelings the best way he knew: rap, modeled after the example set by his 
role model, Eminem.214 By all means, the song is reason for concern and 
should be given appropriate attention. But, it is important to 
acknowledge that Mahan’s concept of socially acceptable 
communication was affected by the Eminem song. The dissent in Pulaski 
recognized this fact, writing that Josh Mahan 
thought Eminem’s lyrics were the best source of inspiration for his 
catharsis. Today’s teenagers witness, experience, and hear violence on 
television, in music, in movies, in video games, and for some, in 
abusive relationships at home. It is hardly surprising that such violence 
 
 208. See Grammy Awards Web Page, http://www.grammy.com/awards/search/ 
index.aspx. 
 209. Doe v. Pulaski, 306 F.3d 616, 619, 625 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 210. Id. at 620. 
 211. Redfield, supra note 143, at 731 n.291 (quoting Jones v. State, 64 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Ark. 
2002)). 
 212. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 620, 626. 
 213. This discussion is not meant to suggest that the mere fact a potential threat is modeled 
after song lyrics should defeat the threat analysis. However, where a song is particularly popular—as 
Kim was—and the “threat” is obviously an imitation, it should certainly affect the analysis. Where in 
the past, youth might have modeled their musings over failed romance after Beatles or Billy Joel 
lyrics, today’s generation instead turns to rap. Consequently, they are expressing their feelings in a 
decidedly more violent way—regardless of whether or not they actually intend to cause any harm. 
 214. This characterization parallels that set forth by the dissenting opinion in Pulaski. See 
Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 631 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
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is reflected in the way they express themselves and communicate with 
their peers, particularly where adult supervision is lacking.215 
Of course, it would be a massive error to automatically exonerate 
any violent teenage speech as merely the imitation of popular music. 
Teenagers are not mindless drones simply repeating the lyrics they hear 
pumping out of their iPods; they know the music is violent. In many 
cases—though not necessarily all cases—they recognize the music might 
not be socially acceptable in all contexts. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Eminem and other popular performers express themselves violently 
certainly makes such expression more acceptable in the minds of some 
teenagers. Thus, it is also an error to automatically interpret such speech 
as a threat. The music that influences teenagers at least must be 
considered. 
To avoid the misclassification of innocuous teenage communication 
as a threat, threat assessment guidelines should accommodate the unique 
nature of adolescent communication. The eleven key questions suggested 
by the Secret Service and Department of Education when assessing a 
threat allow for such an accommodation.216 In contrast, as shown in the 
ensuing analysis, the five-factor test217 proposed by the Eighth Circuit in 
Dinwiddie is too easily swayed by post-Columbine fears.218 
Consequently, the Dinwiddie test is more prone to a false positive. While 
these certainly are not the only two options, a comprehensive evaluation 
of all the possible approaches is impractical. Hence, Dinwiddie is used as 
an example of typical court approaches, and the Secret Service questions 
provide a superior option. The contrast of these two approaches219 is 
illustrated by retrospectively applying both tests to three specific 
examples of varying threat: Porter,220 Pulaski,221 and the tragedy of 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 217. Supra note 104 and accompanying text. The five factors are (1) the reaction of those who 
heard the alleged threat; (2) whether the threat was conditional; (3) whether the person who made the 
threat communicated it directly to the object of the threat; (4) whether the speaker had a history of 
making threats against the person purportedly threatened; and (5) whether the recipient had a reason 
to believe that the speaker had a propensity to engage in violence. United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 
F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 218. As previously discussed, this problem is also true with court approaches that look to the 
impact a reasonable speaker would foresee. 
 219. To simplify this analysis, I am using the Dinwiddie test with its five factors rather than 
the reasonable speaker tests. Regardless, I believe that the application of that approach would also 
succumb to the subjectivity inherent in this context. 
 220. 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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Columbine.222 Admittedly, three cases is a very small sample from 
which to draw conclusions, and the analysis is inevitably affected by the 
actions of school officials.223 Nevertheless, the following three cases 
provide at least a minimal framework through which to evaluate the 
different tests. 
In Porter, most of the Secret Service questions224 can be readily 
answered in the negative and, thus, the conclusion is easily reached that 
no threat existed. Adam’s goals in drawing the imaginary siege of his 
school were likely to express his frustration with school and vent anger. 
There were no communications suggesting intent to attack, and Adam 
had not exhibited any interest in school attacks, weapons, or incidents of 
mass violence.225 Adam had not engaged in attack-related behaviors. 
Although of adequate physical and mental capacities, according to the 
court proceedings, Adam had no access to weapons—aside from a box-
cutter for his after-school job.226 There was no indication of 
hopelessness, desperation, or despair, nor was there indication he saw 
violence as an acceptable way to solve problems. Adam had strong 
trusting relationships with adults. His depiction of events was 
inconsistent with his actions, and before the drawing surfaced, no one 
was concerned about his potential violence. By thus applying the Secret 
Service questions to Adam Porter’s case, it is clear his drawing did not 
 
 221. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 222. See supra note 15. 
 223. In Pulaski, for example, the student was expelled from school after his speech was 
discovered—leaving unanswered the question of what might otherwise have happened. 
 224. Again, for the sake of convenience, the Secret Service questions are 
1.  What are the student’s motives and goals? 
2.  Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack? 
3.  Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in [school attacks or attackers, weapons, 
or incidents of mass violence]? 
4.  Has the student engaged in attack related behaviors? 
5.  Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence? 
6.  Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair? 
7.  Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult? 
8.  Does the student see violence as an acceptable or desirable or the only way to solve 
problems? 
9.  Is the student’s conversation and “story” consistent with his or her actions? 
10.  Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence? 
11.  What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack? 
Supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 611–12. 
 226. Id. at 612. 
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constitute a true threat to school safety. In contrast, the Dinwiddie test—
with its emphasis on the perceptions of others—likely reaches a different 
conclusion. 
 While three of the factors of the Dinwiddie test would not be 
implicated—Adam had no history of making threats, did not 
communicate the threat directly, and the threat was not conditional—two 
important factors would be implicated: the reaction of those who heard 
the alleged threat and whether the recipient had reason to believe Adam 
had a propensity to engage in violence: in the wake of school shootings, 
the drawing itself provided sufficient reason to believe that its creator 
had a propensity for violence. Both of these factors are heavily 
influenced by the post-Columbine fears of educators.  
Similar to Adam Porter, Josh Mahan’s violent but harmless song 
lyrics in Pulaski would be spared extensive scrutiny and punishment 
under the Secret Service questions. His goal was likely to deal with anger 
and frustration stemming from a failed teenage romance.227 He had 
neither engaged in nor shown interest in attacks. As a scrawny fourteen-
year old without access to weapons, it can be argued Josh Mahan lacked 
the capacity to carry out attacks such as those described.228 Virtually 
none of the other questions, applied to him, would suggest that he posed 
a legitimate threat. If nothing else, the obvious hyperbole of his lyrics 
should have lent additional credibility to the argument.229 After all, 
Mahan boasted that he had already murdered his parents and, despite 
being a white youth in rural Arkansas, claimed to be a member of the 
Bloods, a predominately black gang.230 While it could be argued that the 
lyrics represented a plan for who would be killed, it is too vague to 
maintain such a conclusion (there were no details such as when, or 
exactly how). Again, however, the same two Dinwiddie factors 
implicated in Porter are implicated here. Nervous educators could argue 
that since the song eventually reached the ex-girlfriend, direct 
communication took place.231 Furthermore, given the context was a 
break-up, it could be reasoned the threat was conditional. Four of the five 
Dinwiddie factors would thus be implicated, resulting in a false positive 
in terms of threat assessment. Looking back in retrospect, however, as 
 
 227. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 630 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 631. 
 231. Id. at 624. 
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the dissent acknowledged, Josh Mahan did not pose a real threat to 
anyone.232 
Applying the Secret Service questions to the Columbine shooters, 
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the threat posed would be apparent 
immediately. As some observers noted, “the clues were there. The 
obsession with weapons, war and death. The endless rounds of bloody 
computer games. The vicious rantings on the Internet.”233 Their written 
communications crossed the line from expressing anguish to actually 
plotting the attack and setting forth detailed plans and goals of how many 
people would die.234 While Harris and Klebold had not actually engaged 
in any attacks, they were enthralled with weaponry ranging from clubs 
and knives to pipe bombs and the guns they tried to purchase whenever 
possible.235 Both young men threatened violence through the Internet 
and school assignments—violence was clearly an acceptable solution to 
them.236 Interestingly, while the Secret Service questions would identify 
the pair as a risk, they would not necessarily be declared much more 
dangerous than Adam Porter under the Dinwiddie test. 
Only three of the five factors in the Dinwiddie test are present in 
Harris and Klebold’s case. The two factors implicated in Porter are also 
implicated for Harris and Klebold: the reaction of those who heard the 
alleged threat and whether the recipient had reason to believe the speaker 
had a propensity to engage in violence. Harris and Klebold had a history 
of making threats, but their threats were neither directly communicated 
nor conditional and, therefore, do not qualify as threats under this 
factor.237 Consequently, applying the Dinwiddie analysis suggests a 
threat risk only marginally greater than that posed by Adam Porter and 
slightly lesser than that posed by heart-broken, rap-loving eighth grader 
Josh Mahan. 
Of course, not all courts use the Dinwiddie test in evaluating 
threats.238 However, the general principle illustrated by the application of 
Dinwiddie to the three cases above is that any test designed for adults—
as most are—is inadequate when evaluating student threats in a school 
environment scarred by past violence. Further, reliance on a legal 
 
 232. Id. at 630 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 233. Anton & Ryckman, supra note 195. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
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definition of a true threat risks underinclusivity: teenage communications 
may fail the first threshold of intent to communicate, yet still be 
important warning signs that should be addressed. In short, it makes 
more sense—when dealing with teenage speech in the school context—
to simply bypass the initial intent threshold to determine if speech 
constitutes a threat and focus instead on whether actual danger exists. 
The current systems of threat evaluation used by courts are designed 
for a decidedly adult context, and because they neglect the existence of 
warning signs, the systems are woefully inadequate in the school context. 
The same problem is observed in educators who either model their own 
responses after the existing court approaches,239 employ their own 
common-sense judgment colored by fear of school violence, or adopt the 
all-inclusive blanket approach of zero-tolerance policies.240 The adoption 
of the Secret Service Guidelines will significantly improve educators’ 
ability to identify when a true danger exists and respond effectively.  
As with the on-campus/off-campus distinction, the best way to adopt 
a reasonable, youth-specific approach to threat appraisal is through 
binding court precedent.241 In the absence of such precedent, however, 
legislatures and school districts have the ability to adopt clear guidelines 
administrators can follow.242 Schools, administrators, and state and local 
governments have an interest in willingly adopting such policies because, 
in addition to preserving First Amendment rights, such policies also 
promise to be more effective in assuring school safety by encouraging 
speech—consequently increasing the opportunity to identify warning 
signs.243 
C. Safety Benefits of These Proposals 
By punishing speech that does not rise to the level of a “true threat,” 
schools not only risk infringing on students’ First Amendment rights but 
also risk stifling the voice of a potentially violent student. Threatening 
 
 239. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra note 131. 
 241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 242. Similarly, law enforcement officials can also incorporate these principles into their own 
threat assessment process when dealing with youth. 
 243. See supra notes 106–30 and accompanying text. By producing false positives and failing 
to properly contextualize threats, other approaches risk excluding from scrutiny the most dangerous 
threats and focusing instead on non-threats. Further, zero-tolerance laws may be antithetical to the 
goal of school safety by suppressing warning signs that should be brought to the surface. 
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speech has little or no social value,244 but some value exists in the 
warning of potential violence such speech provides. If a potentially 
violent student’s voice is stifled by the threat of automatic 
punishment,245 the risk of violence might worsen because the student 
may seek other methods of expression such as underground newspapers 
or Web sites, as was the case in the Red Lake shootings,246 or the student 
simply might cease to outwardly express thoughts and feelings. Feelings 
of rage and angst might remain hidden until they make themselves 
known in more terrifying and tragic ways. 
In contrast, if students are able to speak freely—like any adult—
when away from school, and if their speech in school is not 
automatically subjected to punishment at the mere hint of frustration or 
anger, their communication with others will increase. With greater 
student speech, a student contemplating violence will be more likely to 
express his feelings. Warning signs will surface and, with the appropriate 
guidelines in place, can be dealt with. A danger known is much safer 
than a danger that goes unspoken until it is too late. In this regard, 
encouraging the open exchange of student speech is as vital to school 
safety as it is to First Amendment rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Balancing the need for school safety and the rights of students to 
express themselves is not an easy task. However, by implementing the 
suggested clarifications, safety and free speech can coexist and augment 
each other. Ultimately, this change consists of determining whether 
speech is on-campus or off-campus. By drawing this distinction tightly, 
educators will be able to focus on on-campus speech with greater 
diligence and resources, allowing law enforcement officials to properly 
regulate off-campus speech. 
With their duties and responsibilities better defined, educators can 
then dedicate the necessary time and effort to evaluate each perceived 
danger carefully and on a case-by-case basis. While a blanket provision 
proclaiming zero tolerance may appeal to parents and educators initially, 
 
 244. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
 245. See discussion of zero-tolerance policies in Part III. 
 246. For example, before the shooting rampage at Red Lake High School, sixteen-year-old 
Jeffrey Weise posted online a violent flash animation depicting a shooting. See School Killer’s 
Animated Terror, supra note 13. The flash animation would not satisfy any of the required prongs to 
be a threat, yet it would serve as a legitimate warning sign, which would have triggered a response. 
The flash animation is one of several expressions of violence that Weise posted on an Internet site. 
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such a policy merely serves to suppress warning signs and protected 
speech alike. Such an approach offers little in terms of enhanced safety 
while eradicating the concept of student speech rights. Strong and 
decisive discipline is not necessarily the solution. Expelling or 
suspending a student does not preclude the student from returning to 
campus with a loaded gun. Rather, it serves to discourage open 
expression that can provide warning signs and thus an opportunity to 
prevent a violent outcome. As part of the evaluation process and 
subsequent response, it is critical that educators make sure troubled 
students receive the counseling and psychological help they need.247 
Effectively identifying warning signs will allow educators and law 
enforcement officials to respond accordingly by giving help and 
counseling to students and by lessening the possibility of violent 
outcomes. Rather than responding to school violence by stamping out all 
student speech rights, the more effective approach will encourage candid 





 247. See generally Redfield, supra note 143. 
